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Whether and when humans in general, and physicians in particular, use their beliefs about base rates in Bayesian
reasoning tasks is a long-standing question. Unfortunately, previous research on whether doctors use their beliefs
about the prevalence of diseases in diagnostic judgments has critical limitations. In this study, we assessed whether
residents’ beliefs about the prevalence of a disease are associated with their judgments of the likelihood of the
disease in diagnosis, and whether residents’ beliefs about the prevalence of diseases change across the 3 years of
residency. Residents were presented with five ambiguous vignettes typical of patients presenting on the inpatient
general medicine services. For each vignette, the residents judged the likelihood of five or six possible diagnoses.
Afterward, they judged the prevalence within the general medicine services of all the diseases in the vignettes.
Most importantly, residents who believed a disease to be more prevalent tended to rate the disease as more likely
in the vignette cases, suggesting a rational tendency to incorporate their beliefs about disease prevalence into their
diagnostic likelihood judgments. In addition, the residents’ prevalence judgments for each disease were assessed
over the 3 years of residency. The precision of the prevalence estimates increased across the 3 years of residency,
though the accuracy of the prevalence estimates did not. These results imply that residents do have a rational
tendency to use prevalence beliefs for diagnosis, and this finding also contributes to a larger question of whether
humans intuitively use base rates for making judgments.
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Use of Bayes’ rule is a fundamental aspect of rational
judgment in probabilistic contexts. Two of the prototyp-
ical cases of the use of Bayes’ rule are in the medical do-
main: prior likelihoods need to be combined with the
sensitivity and specificity of a diagnostic test to calculate
posttest probabilities, and prevalence beliefs (priors)
need to be combined with the knowledge of which dis-
eases cause which signs and symptoms to calculate the
likelihood of preliminary diagnoses. The basics of ra-
tional probabilistic reasoning using likelihoods and
priors are often taught in medical school and in intro-
ductory textbooks on diagnosis (Stern, Cifu, and
Altkorn, 2010). However, there have been few studies on
whether physicians actually use their own beliefs in dis-
ease prevalence for diagnosis, and a number of these* Correspondence: rottman@pitt.edu
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found that medical residents who had a higher-
prevalence belief of a disease rated the disease as more
likely in a diagnosis of vignette cases, implying that resi-
dents’ diagnoses and prevalence beliefs are connected.
This finding should, to some extent, alleviate concern
that physicians may be insensitive to base rates when
forming preliminary diagnoses. However, this finding
emphasizes the importance that physicians have accurate
perceptions of prevalence; we found that accuracy was
only moderate. Future research should be focused on
how prevalence beliefs are learned, whether this learning
can be improved, and also how accurate physicians are
when using prevalence beliefs for diagnosis.Introduction
Diagnostic errors in medicine are major contributors to
poor patient outcomes (Gandhi et al., 2006). One of the
main causes is physicians’ errors in probabilistic reason-
ing, such as prematurely settling on a diagnosisis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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Voytovich, Rippey, and Suffredini, 1985). Bayesian rea-
soning is fundamental to the normative diagnostic
process (Ledley and Lusted, 1959; Pauker and Kassirer,
1980). To calculate the posttest likelihood of a disease,
Bayes’ rule combines the pretest probability of disease
(the prior probability, base rate, or prevalence) and the
likelihood ratio (the sensitivity and specificity of the
test). The same Bayesian framework also applies when
combining the prevalence of a disease with a patient’s
symptoms to determine the likelihood of different diag-
noses, which was the focus of the present study.
The effect of prevalence beliefs on diagnosis
Whether, when, and how people use base rates is a sub-
ject of long-standing debate (Barbey and Sloman, 2007;
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Koehler, 1996). However,
most of the experiments providing a basis for this debate
on base rate “neglect” or underuse have given participants
what resembles an algebra word problem: Participants are
provided with the prior probability and likelihood ratio
and are expected to come up with Bayes’ rule and apply
the equation to the supplied statistics (Agoritsas, Courvoi-
sier, Combescure, Deom, and Perneger, 2011; Casscells,
Schoenberger, and Graboys, 1978; Chambers, Mirchel,
and Lundergan, 2010; Eddy, 1982; Lyman and Balducci,
1994; Puhan, Steurer, Bachmann, and ter Riet, 2005; Sox,
Doctor, Koepsell, and Christakis, 2009; Steurer, Fischer,
Bachmann, Koller, and ter Riet 2002). In everyday clinical
practice, physicians are not provided with external preva-
lence estimates. Though they could seek out prevalence
estimates from the literature, often they rely on their own
beliefs about prevalence estimates, based on either their
previous reading of the literature or their experience.
The main question in this study was whether physi-
cians use their beliefs about prevalence for making pre-
liminary diagnoses. This question has existed for a long
time within medical communities. Theodore E. Wood-
ward, a famous medical researcher and diagnostician,
cautioned students to think of “horses” (common dis-
eases) when hearing hoofbeats (symptoms), not “zebras”
(rare diseases). It is possible that physicians spontan-
eously use their own prevalence beliefs more or less than
they use externally provided statistics.
Researchers in two previous studies assessed whether
doctors use prevalence beliefs based on their own
experience in diagnosis. Unfortunately, these studies
have critical limitations that prohibit strong conclusions.
In one of the studies (Christensen-Szalanski and
Bushyhead, 1981), the researchers found a correlation
between physicians’ judgments of the probability of
pneumonia given different symptoms (e.g., cough) and
the objective predictive value of the symptoms, which
has been widely cited as evidence that doctors use baserates (Christensen-Szalanski and Beach, 1982; Koehler,
1996; Medin and Edelson, 1988). However, it is possible
that the doctors relied only on their knowledge of which
symptoms are more (e.g., crackling sound while breath-
ing) or less (e.g., stomachache) predictive of pneumonia
and did not use base rates at all (Kleiter et al., 1997).
Additionally, the doctors grossly overestimated the likeli-
hood of pneumonia relative to chest x-ray results, imply-
ing that they did not attend to the low base rate of
pneumonia.
In another widely cited study, family practitioners
judged the likelihood of diagnoses for vignette cases
(Weber, Böckenholt, Hilton, and Wallace, 1993). They
judged high-prevalence diseases as being more likely than
low-prevalence diseases, which is consistent with use of
base rates. However, it is also possible that the symptoms
were more consistent with the high-prevalence diseases in
those vignettes.
In summary, the key studies on whether physicians
use the prevalence of diseases when making a diagnosis
have strong alternative explanations. Our goal was to
test this question with a paradigm that controls for these
alternative explanations.
Origins of prevalence beliefs
Another important question is how physicians develop
prevalence beliefs in the first place (Richardson, 1999).
Though published prevalence estimates could serve as a
general guide, prevalence can vary by geographic loca-
tion, patient demographics, and clinical setting. There is
considerable variability in physicians’ prevalence esti-
mates of diseases (Dolan, Bordley, and Mushlin, 1986).
The question addressed here is which factors influence
prevalence beliefs among residents.
One likely factor is residents’ own experiences with
patients. Each resident treats an idiosyncratic set of pa-
tients, which could lead to different prevalence beliefs.
Additionally, highly memorable patients may alter sub-
jective judgments of prevalence (Detmer, Fryback, and
Gassner, 1978; Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman,
and Combs, 1978; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). In the
present study, we did not have a way to capture resi-
dents’ full experiences, nor could we determine which
experiences were most memorable to them. However,
we were able to investigate other hypotheses about how
experience may influence prevalence beliefs.
Specifically, we hypothesized that residents’ prevalence
beliefs may become more precise and accurate across
the 3 years of residency. As the residents in the same
program gain experience, the law of large numbers tends
to make their experiences become more similar, which
should increase precision and accuracy. Prevalence esti-
mates may also become more accurate and precise if
more experienced residents (measured by residency
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prevalence of a disease.1
Present study
In the present study, we examined the effect of residency
year on prevalence judgments, as well as the association
between prevalence judgments and diagnostic judg-
ments. We tested whether residents judge a diagnosis as
more plausible when they personally believe the disease
to have a higher prevalence relative to other residents
who believe the disease to have a relatively lower preva-
lence. The main difference of this approach compared
with past research is that we tested whether physicians’
own prevalence beliefs predict their diagnostic judg-
ments, an across-subject, within-disease effect.
We caution that the relationship between prevalence
and likelihood of diagnosis is expected to be small. First,
as clinical findings accumulate, the prevalence of the dis-
eases normally should become a smaller factor in diag-
nosis. Even in our short vignettes, there were many
clinical findings. Second, as already explained, instead of
testing whether residents believe that more prevalent
diseases are more likely, we tested whether residents
with different beliefs about the prevalence of a single
disease make different diagnostic likelihood judgments
for that disease. This is a much more subtle effect.
To study the origins of the residents’ prevalence be-
liefs, we examined the influence of experience on both
the accuracy and the precision of prevalence judgments.
For precision, we tested whether the standard deviations
of the prevalence estimates for a given disease decreased
across the 3 years of residency. We assessed the influ-
ence of experience on accuracy in two ways. First, we
tested whether the absolute deviation between the mean
prevalence estimate for each disease and the actual
prevalence in the general medicine service at the Univer-
sity of Chicago decreased across the 3 years of residency.
Second, we also report the average correlation between
an individual resident’s prevalence estimates and the ac-




Residents in the internal medicine residency program at
the University of Chicago were recruited by e-mail.
Seventy-two of ninety-eight residents participated, and
four were dropped from the analyses because they pro-
vided repetitive responses, which likely reflected disen-
gagement from the survey. There were 33 year 1
residents (which also included “preliminary” residents
completing 1 year of an internal medicine residency be-
fore doing a residency in another specialty), 18 year 2,
and 17 year 3 residents. The year 1 residents hadcompleted at least 6 months in the residency program
before participation.
Materials
The residents were presented with five vignette cases of
hypothetical patients admitted to the general medicine
service. The vignettes included pertinent history, signs,
symptoms, and vital statistics derived from a physical
examination, but not laboratory examination results.
The cases were chosen so that, across the 5 cases, there
were 24 unique differential diagnoses. (The “differential”
is the set of potential diagnoses. Three diagnoses ap-
peared in two vignettes each, resulting in twenty-seven
diagnostic judgments.) In order that prevalence beliefs
might play a role in diagnosis, the cases were intended
to be ambiguous and without a “right” diagnosis at this
initial stage; if the symptoms clearly pointed to one diag-
nosis, there would be no remaining influence of preva-
lence. Many of the diseases included in the differential
diagnosis are fairly common, which was also intended so
that the residents’ prevalence beliefs could play a role.
Using vignettes of extremely rare diseases would have
been more of an exercise in pathophysiological reason-
ing. Still, including some rare diseases could not be
avoided. Table 1 shows the titles of the vignettes and the
sets of likely diagnoses. The full vignettes are available in
Additional file 1. Four of the vignettes and differential
diagnoses are edited versions of case reports used for
resident education (Couri and Targonski, 2005;
Larochelle and Phillips, 2003; Martinez and Edson, 2004;
Schultz, Lassi, and Edson, 2007). We wanted to include
a vignette with abdominal pain, a frequent diagnostic
challenge, but could not find an appropriate case, and
thus wrote it ourselves.
Procedure
The study was completed online. Participants first
read each of the five vignettes and judged the likeli-
hood (posterior probability) of each diagnosis on the
differential. For each vignette. there were five or six
likely diagnoses on the differential (Table 1), and
there was also a “None of the above” option. Across
the six or seven total options, the likelihoods had to
sum to 100 %.
After working through all five vignettes, participants
reported the prevalence of each of the diagnoses2 in
Table 1 using the following instructions: “For each
diagnosis, please rate how often patients on the gen-
eral medicine service have that diagnosis. For ex-
ample, if you choose x% for Asthma, that means that
x% of patients on the general medicine service have
asthma.” Participants could choose one of the follow-
ing 21 options: 0.01 %, 0.02 %, 0.05 %, 0.1 %, 0.2 %,
1 %, 2 %, … 15 %. We used a previously developed
Table 1 Five vignettes and differential diagnoses with mean prevalence estimates, actual prevalence rates, and mean diagnostic
likelihood estimates
Mean prevalence estimate Actual prevalence Mean diagnostic
likelihood estimate
Regression weight log diagnostic
likelihood on log prevalence
18-year-old woman with headache and sore throat (Martinez and Edson, 2004)
Infectious mononucleosis 0.0040 0.0011 0.3469 0.02
Acute viral hepatitis 0.0053 0.0388 0.0544 0.12
Head and neck malignancy 0.0041 0.0004 0.0299 0.00
Primary HIV infectiona 0.0075 0.0191 0.1193 0.06
Streptococcus pyogenes (group A hemolytic) 0.0081 0.0020 0.3415 0.12
19-year-old man with chest pain, fever, & vomiting (Schultz, Lassi, and Edson, 2007)
Acute myocardial infarction 0.0200 0.0101 0.0250 0.09
Community-acquired pneumonia 0.0806 0.0797 0.1765 0.02
Pulmonary embolus 0.0397 0.0225 0.0928 0.12
Myopericarditis 0.0022 0.0000b 0.3954 0.08
Infective endocarditisa 0.0088 0.0030 0.2018 0.11
23-year-old woman with diffuse muscle & joint pain (Larochelle and Phillips, 2003)
Hodgkin’s disease 0.0017 0.0006 0.0692 0.09
Primary HIV infectiona 0.0081 0.0191 0.0685 0.11
Connective tissue disease (e.g., SLE)a 0.0301 0.0431 0.6226 −0.01
Vasculitis 0.0075 0.0088 0.1287 0.00
Demyelinating polyneuropathy 0.0008 0.0002 0.0285 0.07
Hypothyroidism 0.0643 0.0622 0.0528 −0.08
67-year-old woman with abdominal pain
Abdominal aortic aneurysm 0.0062 0.0077 0.0500 0.13
Appendicitis 0.0057 0.0010 0.1036 0.12
Partial small-bowel obstruction 0.0249 0.0212 0.2543 0.19
Urinary calculus peptic ulcer disease 0.0196 0.0012 0.1174 0.09
Peptic ulcer disease 0.0558 0.0292 0.0860 0.04
Diverticulitis 0.0248 0.0412 0.3584 0.07
61-year-old woman with knee pain and confusion (Couri and Targonski, 2005)
Transient ischemic attack or stroke 0.0205 0.0096 0.1401 −0.13
Encephalitis 0.0031 0.0016 0.1492 −0.02
Connective tissue disease (e.g., SLE)a 0.0301 0.0431 0.0585 0.01
Infective endocarditisa 0.0088 0.0030 0.3686 −0.06
Bacteremia 0.0562 0.0273 0.2390 −0.21
SLE systemic lupus erythematosus
aThis diagnosis appeared in more than one vignette
bTreated as .0001 for analyses
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linear scale and the options below 1 % fell on a
roughly log scale (Woloshin, Schwartz, Byram,
Fischhoff, and Welch, 2000). The 21 options were
placed on a graphical number line with a magnified
scale below 1 %. To make the small percentages eas-
ier to understand, we also presented them as fractions
(0.01 % = 1 in 10,000).Other data sources
For assessing the accuracy of the prevalence estimates,
we used a clinical research database that tracks informa-
tion on patients admitted to the general medicine
service at the University of Chicago (Meltzer et al.,
2002). Patients’ diagnoses based on International Classi-
fication of Diseases, Ninth Revision, codes were obtained
from billing reports. A patient was treated as having a
Rottman et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2016) 1:5 Page 5 of 7diagnosis of interest regardless of whether it was listed
as the primary diagnosis or a secondary diagnosis for
that hospitalization.
Findings
Relationships between prevalence beliefs and diagnostic
likelihood judgments
Table 1 gives the mean diagnostic likelihood judgments.
The following analyses use log diagnostic likelihood
judgments and log prevalence estimates. According to
Bayes’ rule, the log diagnostic judgments should equal
the log prevalence estimates plus the log-likelihood ratio,
which means that log diagnostic judgments and log
prevalence estimates should be linearly related (Griffiths
and Yuille, 2008).
For each of the 27 diseases, we ran a linear regression
to predict the residents’ diagnostic likelihood judgments
on the basis of their prevalence estimates. This analysis
tests for a between-subjects, within-disease effect. Of the
27 regression weights, 21 were positive, 3 were signifi-
cant at α = .05, and 2 more were significant at α = .10. Of
the six diseases with negative slopes, none were signifi-
cant at α = .10.
To test whether there was an overall positive effect of
the prevalence beliefs on diagnosis likelihood judgments,
we ran a one-sample t test on the 27 regression weights
against 0. On the whole, they were significantly positive
[t(26) = 2.58, p = .015]. A binomial test of 21 of 27 was
also significant (p = .006).3 These findings suggest that
believing a disease to be more prevalent is correlated
with higher diagnostic likelihood judgments.
Prevalence estimates
Influence of residency year on the precision of prevalence
estimates
Precision, in this context, is the closeness of agreement
between the residents’ prevalence estimates for a given
disease, and it is canonically calculated with the standard
deviation (Menditto, Patriarca, and Magnusson, 2006).
To determine whether the precision of the prevalence
estimates increased across the 3 years of residency,
within each year of residency we calculated the standard
deviation of the prevalence estimates for each of the 24
unique diseases listed in Table 1. We then compared the
standard deviations using an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with year as a continuous predictor and dis-
ease as a random factor. We ran three versions of this
test using (1) standard deviations, (2) interquartile range
of the log prevalence estimates, and (3) coefficient of
variation, which is the standard deviation divided by the
mean.4 As the years increased, the precision of the
prevalence estimates increased (standard deviations
decreased). This finding was significant in all three ana-
lyses: (1) B = −0.04, F(1,23) = 8.71, p < .01, ηp
2 = 0.12; (2)B = −0.07, F(1,23) = 4.66, p = .04, ηp
2 = 0.08; and (3) B =
−0.09, F(1,23) = 14.68, p < .01, ηp
2 = 0.11.
Influence of residency year on the accuracy of prevalence
estimates
In this context, accuracy (otherwise known as “trueness”
[Menditto et al., 2006] or the opposite of bias) is the
closeness of agreement between the average prevalence
estimate of a disease and the actual prevalence of the
disease in the general internal medicine service at the
University of Chicago. To determine whether the accur-
acy of the prevalence estimates increased across the
3 years of residency, within each year of residency we
calculated the mean of the log prevalence estimates for
each of the 24 unique diseases and compared these
means with the actual log prevalence.5
We took the absolute value of the difference between
the mean log prevalence estimates and the actual log
prevalence and performed ANOVA with year as a con-
tinuous predictor and disease as a random factor. We
did not find a significant effect of year [B = 0.009,
F(1,23) = 0.46, p = 0.50, ηp
2 < .001]. This lack of an effect
means that the accuracy of the estimates did not system-
atically change across the 3 years.
Correlations between prevalence estimates and actual
prevalence
Another way to understand the accuracy of the prevalence
estimates of a given resident is to run a correlation be-
tween the resident’s log prevalence estimates and the ac-
tual log prevalence of the 24 diseases. We then Fisher-
transformed these estimates, took the mean, and inverse-
transformed the means. The average correlations were
virtually identical across the 3 years: year 1 residents rMean
= 0.61, year 2 residents rMean = 0.60, and year 3 residents
rMean = 0.62. Across all the residents, the weakest correl-
ation was r = 0.41 and strongest was r = 0.82.
General discussion
The results of previous research were conflicting as to
whether doctors use base rates in diagnosis. The re-
search suggesting that doctors do not use base rates
enough have used word problems that do not necessarily
reflect typical medical reasoning with one’s own beliefs
(Casscells et al., 1978; Eddy, 1982). As argued above in
the Introduction section, the published articles suggest-
ing that doctors do use base rates contain serious limita-
tions. In the present study, we tested whether residents
who believe a disease to be more prevalent tend to judge
the disease as more likely in the differential diagnosis.
Though this effect was expected to be subtle, we did find
affirmative evidence that residents are sensitive to base
rates. These findings are comforting in that residents ap-
pear to be “more Bayesian” than we might expect.
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possible to assess whether the residents used their own
prevalence beliefs to the right extent. Such an analysis
would require assessing the residents’ beliefs about the
likelihood of each disease producing the particular con-
stellation of symptoms; these likelihoods are hard to
quantify. Simpler cases in which the likelihood ratios
can be quantified, such as making pre-post diagnostic
judgments before vs. after a diagnostic test, suggest that
medical professionals do not use their own pretest be-
liefs enough. Researchers in another study found that
laypeople do not use their own base rate beliefs enough
in a Bayesian updating task (Evans, Handley, Over, and
Perham, 2002). Though we cannot specify, on the basis
of the present study, whether the physicians used their
prevalence beliefs as much as they ought to, the study
demonstrates that they did use their own prevalence be-
liefs in a complicated task with many possible diagnoses.
Where do the residents’ prevalence beliefs come from?
We found that the prevalence beliefs became more
similar (higher precision) over the 3 years of resi-
dency but that they did not become more accurate
relative to the inpatient general medicine service. This
could imply that the driving force in the prevalence
estimates was not the residents’ experiences on the
general medicine service; if so, presumably they would
become more accurate. It is possible that the resi-
dents’ prevalence judgments were influenced by other
experiences (e.g., outpatient experiences or experi-
ences on other services) or that they were influenced
by published prevalence estimates or other socially
communicated prevalence beliefs.
In conclusion, this study presents the strongest evi-
dence to date that residents are sensitive to prevalence
beliefs when performing a diagnosis. Though their
prevalence beliefs are correlated with the actual preva-
lence in the hospital, the correlations are not extremely
high (r2 = .37). Thus, helping residents develop accurate
prevalence beliefs may improve diagnosis.
Endnotes
1In the closest prior literature, researchers investigated
whether prognostic judgments and initial diagnoses, not
prevalence judgments, became more precise and accur-
ate across the 3 years of residency, with mixed results
(Dolan et al., 1986; Shapiro, 1977).
2Participants made 27 diagnostic judgments and then
24 prevalence judgments. The order of the five vignettes,
the order of the diagnostic judgments within each vi-
gnette, and the order of the prevalence judgments were
randomized. The large number of judgments of each
type serves as a type of distractor in that it would be
hard to remember the diagnostic judgment when later
making the prevalence judgment for the same disease.3A linear regression with by-subject and by-disease
crossed random effects on the intercept and the slope of
the prevalence estimates was also significant (b = .047,
SE = .017, p = .008).
4The coefficient of variation is a measure of dispersion
of a probability distribution that normalizes for the
mean (Woloshin et al., 2000). It is useful in the present
context because diseases with higher mean prevalence
ratings also tend to have higher standard deviations.
5For this analysis and the one below, the prevalence of
myopericarditis, which was actually zero in the dataset,
was treated as having the lowest possible prevalence on
the prevalence scale (0.01 %).
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